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Missed Opportunities: California
Energy Fears, New York Energy Policy
and the New York Power Authority's
New York City Turbine Projects
JOHN L. PARKER
JAMES MALATRAS*
I. Introduction
Energy policy is at a crossroads in New York State. New York
State Energy Law requires the New York State Energy Planning
Board to develop a statewide energy plan every four years and the
next plan will be finalized in the spring of 2002.1 New York's pri-
mary law dealing with electric power plant siting, Article X of the
Public Service Law, will sunset on January 1, 2003.2 The feder-
ally initiated era of deregulation of the early 1990's has posed
multifarious environmental, economic, and health problems that
states, like New York, have been left to come to grips with and,
although the state has made several attempts to work within the
landscape of deregulation, it has yet to prove successful. 3 With
* John L. Parker J.D., 1996 Pace University School of Law. Counsel to Assem-
blyman Richard Brodsky, Chairman of the New York State Assembly Committee on
Corporations, Authorities and Commissions. James Malatras, Doctoral Candidate in
Political Science, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy. Policy Analyst to
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky. Special thanks to Fred Zalcman, Executive Director
of the Pace Law School Energy Law Project for his support.
1. See NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, NEW
YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN - JUNE 2002, at http://www.nyserda.org/sep.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 22, 2003).
2. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 160-72 (McKinney 2002) (noting each statute to
be effective until January 1, 2003). The authors would like to note that this article
was completed in December of 2001 and was intended to offer a contemporaneous look
at the New York State energy issues it addresses. Many of the issues remain unset-
tled, and Article X of the Public Service Law has sunset.
3. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discrimina-
tory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (proposed May 10, 1996) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) (calling for the opening of wholesale power
sales to competition); Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-
Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (pro-
posed May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt 37) (ensuring that transmission
owners do not have an unfair advantage in using transmission to sell power).
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the expiration of two critical energy policies and the continued
problems of energy deregulation, New York enters a decisive pe-
riod of how to correct the ills of irrational energy policy.
Last year, actions by several state agencies have demon-
strated the need for improved energy policy. Forecasts have pre-
dicted an electricity shortage in the future, but as we will
illustrate, it is not the ominous portent the state is portraying.
Since September of 2000, the Department of Public Service
("DPS"), the Power Authority of the State of New York ("PASNY"),
the Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") and New
York Independent System Operator ("ISO") forecasted California-
style blackouts for the summer of 2001. These agencies have per-
petuated fears that New York will be the next California, and in
response have made a series of questionable legal moves which
may have a detrimental effect on the environment and health of
the state. We will illustrate that Article X, as well as the current
State energy system of production and distribution, is seriously
flawed and that deregulation has not been good for the consumer
or the environment. 4
Recent developments illustrated a number of decisions to
build new power plants and restart older power plants without
following state environmental laws. We shall focus on one exam-
ple, the State's decision to install 10 generators in the New York
City area, and illustrate how the State's accelerated siting process
subverted environmental laws because of preexisting flaws within
the state energy market.
By focusing on one example, it will be shown that this new
system has brought New York to its current situation-the build-
ing of numerous plants without a comprehensive or rational en-
ergy plan, and a push for distributed generators, increasing
pollution of the State's air, water, and other natural resources,
such as approving the Athens power plant in the historically rich
and natural landscape of the Mid-Hudson Valley. The decision to
build these generators in New York City in 2001 has set the prece-
dent for use of this strategy elsewhere, raises environmental jus-
tice concerns, and illustrates the current shortsighted approach of
New York's energy policy.
4. In California, deregulation became so unpopular that the California Energy
Commission Internet Homepage once provided a whole section of how consumers
could file a complaint "about [their] Bills or Deregulation."
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II. Power Authority of the State of New York's Siting of
Electric Turbines In New York City: Legal and
Policy Issues
In August of 2000 PASNY sited 10 gas turbines in various
locations around New York City for the explicit purpose of closing
"the anticipated gap in electrical generating capacity and [to] en-
sure the reliability of the New York City metropolitan area's elec-
tric system."5 According to PASNY, "the Department of Public
Service informed PASNY that immediate action is needed to as-
sure adequate electrical supply next summer, and to help protect
and preserve human life, health, property, and natural re-
sources."6 PASNY claimed that in response to this request, the
"NYPA Trustees on August 29, 2000 approved a resolution to
purchase up to eleven" gas turbines.7
PASNY's description shows the expedited nature of the pro-
cess that was followed to install the gas turbines. In a letter dated
October 12, 2000, DPS indicated to PASNY that there was the
need for an additional 315 MW of generating capacity in New
York City.8 The letter, identifying the need for additional gener-
ating capacity, was dated over one month after PASNY approved
the resolution to purchase the gas turbines raising questions. The
authorization to purchase before the statement of need was re-
ceived raises questions about process the agency followed for its
determination of need. The October 12, 2000 letter also raised
questions about PASNY's assertion that the turbine purchase was
in response to the Public Service Commission ("PSC") request.
PASNY installed General Electric LM 6000 simple-cycle gas
turbines, each of which is essentially a jet engine housed in a mod-
ular unit, that are coupled with air-cooled electric generators.9
The gas turbines "can provide a constant power output of 47 MW
at ambient temperatures up to 100' F, of which 3 MW are re-
quired for onsite operations and 44 MW are available for distribu-
tion on the electrical grid."10 The maximum capacity for the dual
5. NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FORM FOR SITE
SELECTION AND INSTALLATION OF TEN NATURAL GAS TURBINE GENERATORS IN NEW
YORK CITY AND LONG ISLAND A-2 (2000) [hereinafter PASNY EAF].
6. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at A-3.
7. Id.
8. Letter from Howard Tarler, Chief, Bulk Transmissions System for the Public
Service Commission, to Robert Hiney, Executive Vice President-Project Operations,
New York Power Authority 1 (Oct. 12, 2000).
9. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at A-3.
10. Id. at S-14.
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gas turbine site would be 94 MW, with a net output of 88 MW of
electricity to the grid. The number of gas turbines installed and
the chosen sites included:
Sunset Park, Brooklyn: 23rd and 3rd Avenues - 2 turbines
Williamsburg, Brooklyn: North 1st Street and River Street -
1 turbine
Long Island City, Queens: 42 - 30 Vernon Blvd. - 2 turbines
South Bronx: Harlem River Rail Yards at East
132nd Street - 2 turbines
South Bronx: East 132nd to East 134thStreet,
Locust Avenue - 2 turbines
Brentwood, Long Island: Pilgrim State Hospital, Islip -
1 turbine. 1 1
State Law requires an environmental review when a new
power plant is sited. The review may be conducted pursuant to
either Article X of the Public Service Law ("PSL"), or to the State
Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"), depending upon
the plant's generating capacity. 12 In this case, PASNY concluded
that Article X did not apply; a decision by the Siting Board con-
firmed their interpretation, and concluded that no environmental
impact statement was required under SEQRA because the project
had no "significant" adverse environmental impact.
A. PSL Article X Review
Article X of the PSL sets forth a process for the siting of major
electric generating facilities. The statute applies to electric gener-
ating facilities with "a generating capacity of eighty thousand
kilowatts or more.' 13 The Electric Generating Facility Siting
Board ("Siting Board") oversees the Article X review process. 14
The review concludes when the Siting Board decides whether to
11. Id. at A-3. As will be discussed, the locations of the turbines are critical in
understanding the problems with the current state of energy policy in New York.
12. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW
§ 164 (McKinney 2002) (outlining application requirements); N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw
§ 160(2) (McKinney 2002) (defining "[miajor electric generating facility" as facility
with generating capacity of greater than 80,000 kilowatts).
13. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 160(2).
14. The seven member Siting Board consists of the Commissioners of the Depart-
ment of Public Service ("DPS"), Environmental Conservation, Health, State Energy
Office, Economic Development, and two ad-hoc members. The Commissioner of the
DPS chairs the Siting Board. Id. § 160(4).
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issue a "certificate of environmental compatibility and public
need" which is required for operation.15 There was no question
that Article X did not apply to the proposed sites that had one gas
turbine capable of producing 47 MW at maximum capacity. The
Siting Board agreed that under that condition, Article X would not
apply to the dual turbine sites. On October 31, 2000, PASNY
sought a declaratory ruling from the Siting Board that Article X
did not apply to the siting of four sites that had two turbine gener-
ating facilities. 16 In the petition to the Siting Board, PASNY
agreed to a "legally binding commitment" that the units will not
operate at or above 80 MW. 17
For many, the Siting Board's decision raised more questions
than it answered. On its face, the Siting Board's decision allowed
the dual turbine facilities to generate 85.9 MW in direct violation
of the 80MW threshold language found in Article X.18 Many ar-
gued that the decision was contrary to the statutory language and
therefore illegal. Two separate lawsuits were brought, but the
courts did not reach the 80 MW question.' 9 Under the statutory
language, a "'major electric generating facility' means an electric
generating facility with a generating capacity of eighty thousand
kilowatts or more."20 The Siting Board concluded that if a "legally
binding commitment" is made the "units will not be operated at a
total net generating capacity of 80 MW or more," then "the gener-
ating facility so constructed and so operated will not be a major
electric generating facility," and therefore, not subject to Article
X.21 The Siting Board's decision cleverly added the term "net" to
the statutory "generating capacity" language, which can be read
15. Id. § 160(6). See also N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 162(1), 168, & 169 (describing
the certification requirements).
16. See Petition by the Power Auth. of New York for a Declaratory Ruling that a
Bd. Certificate is Not Required for Combinations at a Site of Generators that Shall Be
Operated at a Combined Wattage of Less than Eighty Thousand Kilowatts, Declara-
tory Ruling Concerning Standard for Defining Generating Capacity, N.Y.S. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & the Env't, 2000 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 911, *1
(No. 00-F-1934) (Nov. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Siting Board Decision].
17. Id.
18. Id. at *1-2.
19. See generally UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001); Sil-
vercup Studios, Inc. v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 2001) (finding in UP-
ROSE that it was sufficient to prepare an environmental assessment form whereby
the Power Authority promised they would not exceed the 80 MW capacity, while Sil-
vercup Studios focused on the importance and necessity of an Environmental Impact
Statement).
20. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 160(2) (McKinney 2002).
21. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *13-14 (emphasis added).
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as effectively allowing an 85.9 MW generating capacity for each
double turbine site. Net capacity is gross MW capacity minus op-
erational MW which equals net operational MW. In this case, the
"net" calculation allows actual generation of 85.9 MW, or 79.9 MW
plus 6 MW to operate the two units.
The Siting Board concluded that the statute left the "nature
of the 80,000-kilowatt test for exemptions to the discretion of the
Chairman of the Board."22 The Siting Board's analysis focused on
whether the Legislature intended "generating capacity" to mean
"a design standard" or "an operational standard."23 The Siting
Board reasoned that an operational standard "is logical because
whether one is concerned with the environment, the consumer, or
both, a plant's actual generation is much more significant than its
theoretical capacity. ' 24 The Siting Board's reasoning is in re-
sponse to arguments by various petitioners that Article X should
apply in this case because two generating facilities have a "name-
plate rating of 94 MW and a net capacity of 88MW."25
The Siting Board reasoned, "[blecause an exemption based on
a plant's actual operation, as opposed to its nameplate capacity, is
not only consistent with Article X's legislative history, but a more
accurate gauge of a project's potential environmental impact, the
operational standard is a more realistic method for deciding which
projects must follow Article X."26 The Siting Board relied upon
"legislative intent" specifically referred to in a Division of Budget
22. Id. at *10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *8. While the Article X statutory language explicitly includes exemp-
tions from its provisions, it does not include an exemption for 'operational restrictions'
as suggested by the Siting Board. Exemptions from Article X include: (a) facilities
that applied for a permit within 180 days of signing into law or if under construction,
(b) facilities over which the federal government exercises exclusive jurisdiction, (c)
facilities under repairs that do not "result in an increase in capacity of the facility of
more than fifty thousand kilowatts," (d) facilities constructed on lands dedicated to
industrial uses and generating capacity for such premises does not exceed 200,000
kilowatts, or (e) facilities generating electricity from combustion of solid waste. N.Y.
PUB. SERv. LAW § 162(4)(a)-(e).
25. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *5. The petitioning parties were,
"Citizens United for Responsible Energy (CURE), Environmental Advocates (EA),
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), New York Institute of Legal Research
(NYILR), New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, Inc. (NYLPI), New York Public
Interest Research Group (NYPIRG), Southern Energy Bowline, L.L.C; Southern En-
ergy Lovett, L.L.C.; and Southern Energy NYGen, L.L.C. (the Southern parties)." Id.
at *4 n.2.
26. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 20432
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report to support its position.27 The memo, from an Executive
branch agency, characterized the bill as applying on a "mandatory
basis" to "'a facility... that produces eighty thousand kilowatts or
more.'"28 The language relies on the term 'produces' for the pro-
position that an "operational" capacity is what the legislature in-
tended. The Siting Board concluded "[wihile the legislative
history does not expressly spell out the purpose of the 80,000-kilo-
watt cutoff, it suggests that the 80,000-kilowatt standard should
be based on a plant's actual production, rather than its name-
plate. '29 The Siting Board does not explain how the word "pro-
duces" in a Department of Budget memo, with no other reference
to any other document in the Legislative record justifies its legal
interpretation. In light of the plain language of the statute, the
legal reasoning appears dubious at best, but the Department of
Budget memo provides tenuous authority to allow the Board to
conclude that the legislature intended an actual production defini-
tion versus a nameplate capacity definition.
27. Id. at *9 n.4; see also 1992 N.Y. Laws 1471. Only two of the sixteen memos in
the S. 4912-A bill jacket reviewed by the authors use the word "produces" when dis-
cussing the 80 MW threshold requirement of the statute. Two memoranda state "pro-
duces." One states, "[a] new article of the Public Service Law reestablishes a
certification process for the siting of new electric generating facilities producing 80
MW or more." Memorandum from William E. Davis, Senior Vice President, Niagara
Mohawk Power Corporation, to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 21,
1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992). The other states,
"[diefinition of'major electric generating facility' has been revised from a facility that
produces fifty thousand kilowatts or more to one that produces eighty thousand kilo-
watts or more." Memorandum, Budget Report on 10 Day Bills (July 9, 1992), re-
printed in Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992). Other memoranda in the
bill jacket do not state "produce," but rather refer to "capacity." See Memorandum
from Howard A. Fromer, General Counsel, N.Y.S. Energy Office, to Elizabeth D.
Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 14, 1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket 1992 ch. 519,
S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[tihe new siting provision . . . would apply to both
steam and non-steam facilities with generating capacities of 80 MW or more."); Mem-
orandum from Stanley B. Klimberg, General Counsel, Long Island Power Authority,
to Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 8, 1992), reprinted in Bill
Jacket 1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[iun addition, the new Article X
provisions would apply to both steam and non-steam facilities ... with a generating
capacity of 80 megawatts or more."); Memorandum from Langdon Marsh, Executive
Department Commissioner, N.Y.S. Department of Environmental Conservation, to
Elizabeth D. Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 16, 1992), reprinted in Bill Jacket
1992 ch. 519, S. 4912-A (N.Y. 1992) (stating "[tihey extend to all major electric gener-
ating facilities, as opposed to all major steam electric facilities, with a threshold of 80
MW.").
28. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *9 n.4 (citing "the Budget Report on
10 Day Bills for $4912A, which describes the definition of 'major electric generating
facility.'").
29. Id. at *8.
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B. The Siting Board's Decision Sets a Precedent for Energy
Policy in New York that May Compromise Public Health
Protections
The precedent set by the PASNY petition is far reaching. In
December 2000, the PSC asked that utilities "consider identifying
appropriate sites for small-scale generation (less than 80MW) and
provide information regarding small-scale generation units that
they expect to be installed in the near future."30 The PSC's call for
additional sites also became a de facto energy policy of the state,
particularly in the New York City metro area and on Long Island,
due to electrical infrastructure issues, such as transmission of
electricity to these regions.
Under the Siting Board's decision, government or private en-
tities can effectively bypass the procedural safeguards and envi-
ronmental review afforded by Article X. Other power plant
operators were quick to exploit PASNY's approach. In mid-2001,
the Long Island Power Authority ("LIPA") proposed an almost
identical plan to use turbines on Long Island.31 LIPA proposed
"10 new mini-plants" (the same General Electric LM 6000 models
used by the PASNY) to avoid potential energy shortfalls in the
summer of 2002.32 Calling the mini-plants "peaking stations,"
LIPA argues that they will be used only when demand is high and
energy supply is low. Turbines that will be placed in Port Jeffer-
son, Glenwood Landing, Shoreham and Brentwood have each been
earmarked to produce only 79.9 MW, and are therefore not subject
to Article X.33 On November 13, 2001, LIPA approved the Envi-
ronmental Assessment ("EA") under SEQRA and issued a nega-
30. In re a Status Report on the Demand/Supply Component of the Department's
Electric Price and Reliability Task Force Including Recommendations for Specific
Utility Actions on the Demand-Side, Order Requiring Filings and Reports on Utility
Demand Response Programs, N.Y.S. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 00-E-2054 (Dec. 20,
2000), 2000 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 1041, at *5.
31. See Press Release, Long Island Power Authority, LIPA and KeySpan An-
nounce Second Plan for New Generation (July 12, 2001), at http://www.lipower.org/
newscenter/pr/2001/julyl2_01.htm (explaining the proposal to construct two new com-
bustion turbines fueled by natural gas); see also LONG ISLAND POWER AUTHORITY,
COMBUSTION TURBINE PROJECT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (Nov. 13, 2001), at http:/
/www.lipower.org/pdfs/EA/Global%20EA.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (providing
project description and project-wide Environmental Assessment of five proposed
facilities).
32. Elissa Gootman, Proposed Mini-Plants Are Part of a Long-Term Energy Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at D6.
33. Press Release, Long Island Power Authority., LIPA Announces Five New
Turbine Generators for Shoreham, Brentwood and Bethpage (Oct. 18, 2001), at http:/!
www.lipower.org/newsenter/pr/2001/octl8-Ol.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
[Vol. 20434
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tive declaration, fast tracking the turbines which are set to move
forward subject to DEC approval.34 The LIPA turbine proposal
and the ability to avoid Article X review shows the true implica-
tions of PASNY's actions on energy policy in New York.
III. SEQRA Review of the Siting of the Electric Generators
The Siting Board's determination that Article X did not apply
to PASNY's dual turbine sites in Brooklyn, Bronx and Queens
triggered the environmental review provisions under SEQRA.35
SEQRA requires state agencies to take a "hard look" at the envi-
ronmental impacts of their actions, and to consider alternatives. 36
The intent of the environmental impact statement ("EIS") process
is for government decision makers to have all of the relevant and
necessary facts before making decisions on projects that may have
an environmental impact.37 The statute's aim is that the agency
will have sufficient information at the end of the process to decide
whether to approve the project. 38 If the agency chooses to move
forward, it must mitigate those impacts identified. 39
In this case, PASNY was the lead agency charged with imple-
menting SEQRA. PASNY conducted a single environmental as-
sessment for all six of the turbine sites, with each sites'
characteristics and analysis included as attachments to the main
analysis. The EA concluded that the siting of these turbines was a
Type I action, which the law defines as "those actions and projects
that are more likely to require the preparation of an EIS."40 A
Type I action "carries with it the presumption that it is likely to
have a significant adverse impact on the environment."41 An
34. Press Release, Long Island Power Authority, LIPA Board Approves Environ-
mental Assessment of Powering LI 2002 Turbine Projects (Nov. 13, 2001), at http:ll
www.lipower.org/newscenter/pr/2001/novl3-01_b.htm; see also Christine Woodside,
Cross-Sound Cable Takes Step Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 14LI, at 2.
35. SEQRA review is required for the single turbine sites because these facilities
fall below the Article X 80 MW threshold. See UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d
42, 46 (App. Div. 2001); Silvercup Studios, Inc. v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49
(App. Div. 2001). The Siting Board in its decision also explicitly recognizes the appli-
cability of SEQRA. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *11.
36. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0106 (McKinney 2002);
H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (App. Div. 1979).
37. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(7); WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v.
Planning Bd., 568 N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 1991).
38. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0103(7); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
6, § 617.11(d) (2002).
39. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0109(8).
40. N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.4(a) (emphasis added).
41. Id. § 617.4(a)(1) (emphasis added).
20021 435
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agency can rebut this presumption if the record "show[s] that it
identified the relevant areas of environmental concern, took a
'hard look' at them and made a 'reasoned elaboration' of the basis
for its determination."4 2
SEQRA regulations require the lead agency to "thoroughly
analyze the identified relevant areas of environmental concern to
determine if the action may have a significant adverse impact on
the environment," and provide a "reasoned elaboration" of its con-
clusions. 43 The threshold for a full environmental review is very
low, requiring only "the potential for at least one significant ad-
verse environmental impact" for the lead agency to issue a "posi-
tive declaration," and prepare a full EIS.4 4 PASNY concluded that
there were no significant environmental impacts, and issued a
negative declaration or "neg. dec." which effectively ended the sub-
stantive environmental review process.4 5  Upon review of
PASNYs EA, the court concluded that a full Environmental Im-
pact Statement was required.4 6
Community groups raised many substantive environmental
issues regarding the siting of the turbines. The issues raised in-
clude particulate matter, noise, and the impact of the project on
community character. The groups alleged that the EA failed to
address whether the turbines would release air pollution called
particulate matter of 2.5 microns or less ("PM 2.5"), which are fine
soot particles that when inhaled are linked to health problems,
including asthma and premature death, into the communities sur-
rounding these facilities. Particulate matter is recognized as a
non-threshold pollutant, meaning that any ambient concentration
may cause adverse health threats.47 This fact raises a significant
enough environmental and public health issue to warrant full en-
42. H.O.M.E.S., 418 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
43. N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.7(b)(3)-(4) (2002).
44. Id. § 617.7(a)(1) (emphasis added).
45. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at 1-2. The negative declaration applies to the
SEQRA review of all of the proposed gas turbines. Id. The power plant proposed for
Staten Island originally received a positive declaration, but subsequently was with-
drawn from consideration as a power plant location.
46. See UPROSE, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (concluding that in light of the "potential
adverse health effects that can result from PM 2.5 emissions," NYPA failed to take
the requisite "hard look"); see also Silvercup Studios, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 49-50 (ruling
the Supreme Court properly annulled the neg. dec. and required preparation of a full
EIS because EAF revealed several areas of potentially significant environmental
impact).
47. See UPROSE, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (defining non-threshold pollutant as having
some possibility of causing an adverse health impact at any concentration).
436 [Vol. 20
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vironmental review. On this issue the Court concluded that
PASNY's analysis of particulate matter "is not sufficiently de-
tailed in the EAF and is not an adequate substitute for addressing
the health impacts of PM 2.5 emissions."48 The issue is of particu-
lar relevance because the turbines are located in neighborhoods
that have some of the highest asthma hospitalization rates in the
world.49
Community residents also commented on noise impacts.
They alleged that the noise coming from the fully operating facil-
ity exceeded city noise limitations. 50 They also alleged that the
EA was based upon testing methods that can overestimate back-
ground noise levels. Noise can have an adverse impact on people
living or working near the turbines. Increased noise levels can
have a range of adverse impacts on people, including stress, ill-
ness, sleep deprivation, and interference with learning.
The EA analysis stated that the turbine buildings would be
similar to existing neighborhood buildings, and therefore, were
consistent with the existing uses. 51 The turbines are located in
minority communities that are in the process of reclaiming their
waterfront areas. The PASNY analysis effectively concluded that
since these communities are industrial in character, no industrial
project could negatively affect the neighborhoods. This conclusory
assertion is not based on any analysis of the actual impact on the
communities. Additionally, the sites are located next to parks and
48. See id. at 46.
49. See Kenneth M. McConnochie et al., Socioeconomic Variation in Asthma Hos-
pitalization: Excess Utilization or Greater Need?, 103 PEDIATRICS e75 (1999), availa-
ble at http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/103/6/e75 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003)
(noting that the high incidence of severe asthma among inner-city children is attribu-
table in part to adverse environmental conditions); see also CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,
Top NEW YORK COUNTIES SUFFERING THE GREATEST PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACTS DUE TO
POWER PLANT PARTICULATE EMISSIONS (2000) (figure provided by the American Lung
Association, Brooklyn); NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF HEALTH, ASTHMA FACTS, fig. 5, at 5
(1999) available at http://www.asthma-nyc.org/publications/AsthmaFacts.pdf (indi-
cating higher rates of asthma hospitalization in NYC's poor neighborhoods).
50. PASNY acknowledged technical violations of city noise ordinances. PASNY
EAF, supra note 6, at S-18, D-24 to D-27; see also NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, CEPO-CEQR NOISE ExPosuRE STANDARDS §§ 42-20 &
42-21 (1993) (stating that "any new activity shall not increase the ambient noise level
by 3 dBA or more.").
51. PASNY EAF, supra note 6, at C-10.
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schools. 52 PASNY eventually added a brief Environmental Jus-
tice section to the EA, after the sites were approved. 53
In the Siting Board's decision to 'exempt' the dual turbine in-
stallation sites from the requirements of Article X, it suggested at
a minimum that the siting of these facilities would require a
SEQRA review. 54 SEQRA requires the applicant to make a "dem-
onstration that the facility will satisfy electric generating capacity
needs."55 This showing would have answered many questions
that still remain regarding whether there was a need for these
turbines. However, the PASNY neg. dec. ended the review process
at the Environmental Assessment stage, and allowed PASNY to
avoid showing electric capacity 'need,' and thereby precluded a full
and substantive environmental impact review.
IV. Energy Need, California and New York's Rationale for
Fast Tracking the NYPA Turbines
PASNY cited the PSC's letter of an "urgent and compelling
need" for additional electric generating capacity to justify, in part,
the installation of the turbines in New York City.56 The addi-
tional electricity capacity, the PSC argued, was required for the
City to meet the New York Independent Systems Operator's ("NY-
ISO") 80% locational capacity requirement. 57 NYISO is a private
organization that was created in New York after deregulation to
monitor electricity sales, prices, needs, and electricity distribution
in the State.
The locational requirements in New York City are in place
because of congestion, or 'bottlenecking' in the electricity supply
52. See Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State
to Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of Michael D. Zarin, Esq., Attorney, Zarin and Steinmetz, & Eliza-
beth C. Yeampierre, Executive Director, UPROSE).
53. Id. (testimony of New York Power Authority).
54. Siting Board Decision, supra note 17, at *11.
55. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)(h) (McKinney 2002).
56. See Tarler Letter, supra note 9, at 1. There were similar predictions for sum-
mer of 2000. On May 22, 2000, the NYISO concluded that in-city generation capacity
would be short by approximately 300 MW. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, LOCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS STUDY COVERING THE NEW YORK CONTROL AREA FOR THE 2000-2001
CAPABILITY YEAR 7 (2000), available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/
planning/pdf/locational reqmts-study-master-rev5.pdf [hereinafter NYISO LOCA-
TIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY].
57. See Tarler Letter, supra note 9, at 1; NYISO LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
STUDY, supra note 57, at 3, 7.
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grid that restricts the transmission of upstate and out of state
generated electricity to the City. The resulting shortage can in-
crease the City's susceptibility to power outages. In response, NY-
ISO requires the City to have the ability to generate 80% of its
electric needs in-city. 58 In 2001, the 80% requirement translated
into a need for 8,427 MW of in-city generation. 59 This projection
was based upon the PSC's finding that the summer 2000's capac-
ity requirement was 8,272 MW, plus a 1.5% (155 MW) projected
demand increase in 2001, yielding a 2001 Summer Capacity Re-
quirement ("2001 SCR") of 8,427 MW.60
Several questions were raised regarding the accuracy of the
PSC assertion that an additional 315 MW were needed. Environ-
mental advocates pointed out that several generating sources that
were to be available in summer 2001 were not included by the
PSC in its October 2000 electricity needs analysis. These un-
counted, but available generating sources, totaled up to 527 MW
of in-city capacity.6 1 As advocates pointed out and available docu-
ments showed, the additional unaccounted capacity erased the
315 MW deficit, resulting in a surplus of up to 212 MW of in-city
generation capacity for the summer of 2001. The conflicting num-
bers offered by different sources underscores the difficulty in fore-
casting electric generating capacity needs, and raises questions
about the adequacy of the analysis that the PSC relied upon. This
is not to say that all of these facilities would have been online or
that there was no need for concern. However, it appeared that the
PSC may not have been as thorough in its analysis as it could
58. NYISO LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY, supra note 57, at 3, 7.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 7. (indicating 155 MW figure derived from taking 1.5% of the PSC
estimate for the summer 2001 MW load of 10,340); see also Tarler Letter, supra note
9, at 1 (indicating that "electric load growth in the City will continue to increase by at
least 1.5% per year."); ENERGY COMMITTEE, NEW YORK BUILDING CONGRESS, A MATTER
OF URGENCY: NEW YORK CITY'S ELECTRIC SUPPLY NEEDS 14 (2001) (using the 8,272
MW figure).
61. Affidavit of Ashok Gupta in support of Verified Petition 2, 6, 25, 27, 29, 32,
UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001). The additional generat-
ing capacity comes from the following currently available facilities: Astoria at 170
MW, an increased capacity of existing sources at 157 MW, a Key Span site at 40 MW
and Linden Cogeneration at 70 MW; other sites available by June 2001: ConEd Unit
10 at 60 MW and increased capacity of ConEd Gowanus at 30 MW, totaling 527 MW.
The analysis is based, in part, upon Natural Resources Defense Council Senior En-
ergy Economist Ashok Gupta's review and analysis of publicly available documents on
generating capacity in New York City in preparation for litigation against NYPA. It
is important to note that Mr. Gupta's analysis is the only detailed analysis specifically
looking at the PSC's claimed 315 MW deficiency. The PSC and NYPA have produced
no equivalent analysis, but would be required to do so under SEQRA.
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have been. Subsequent studies from NYISO and the PSC confirm
the apprehension on this point.
The question regarding how much electricity capacity was
needed for summer 2001 was further complicated by other elec-
tricity initiatives. The amended System Benefits Charge ("SBC")
for utilities has provided a monetary incentive for efficiency. Be-
ginning in 2001, the PSC increased overall SBC funding from
$78.1 million to $150 million. 62 This funding caused a decreased
energy demand, which was not factored into the original PSC
needs analysis. As the PSC stated in its order, "[allong with the
newly added $10 million set aside program, these intensive peak
load reduction programs and the other energy saving programs of
the extended five-year program are expected to substantially re-
duce demand by the summers of 2001 and 2002."63 The New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority ("NYSERDA")
projected that SBC programs would "result in peak demand reduc-
tion of 250 - 300 MW by summer 2001," and the entire project is
"projected to reduce peak demand by nearly 1,300 MW by 2006."64
In addition to the SBC changes, NYISO is considering a De-
mand Response Program that would pay large customers and sup-
pliers who could aggregate their customers in order to scale back
electricity demand at peak times.65 The program would provide a
tremendous financial incentive to reduce electricity use, and
would also result in decreased electricity needs during peak load
times in summer 2001.
PASNY spent over $510 million to purchase the ten turbines
from General Electric. 66 PASNY stated that it had sufficient re-
62. In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Order Continu-
ing and Expanding the System Benefits Charge for Public Benefit Programs, N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 94-E-0952, 2001 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 77, at *22-23 (Jan. 26,
2001).
63. Id. at *39. The issue here is whether the PSC forecasters had knowledge of
the proposed changes to the SBC, and how those changes would impact electricity
need forecasts.
64. NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SYSTEMS
BENEFITS CHARGE: PROPOSED OPERATING PLAN FOR NEW YORK ENERGY $SMART PRO-
GRAMS (2001-2006) 2 (2002), available at http://www.nyserda.org/sbc200l-2006.pdf
(last visited Feb. 4, 2003) [hereinafter NYSERDA, SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGE].
65. See NEENAN ASSOCIATES L.L.C., NYISO PRL PROGRAM EVALUATION: ExEcu-
TIVE SUMMARY E-2 to E-3 (2002), available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/docu-
ments/groups/bic-price-responsive-wg/demand-response/evaluation/exec-summary-
final.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
66. Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to
Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
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sources on hand to make this purchase, and the deal would not
cause tax increases, or loss of services from the agency. The price
is significant because experts have conservatively estimated that
a 1 MW reduction can be reached for each $1 million spent in elec-
tricity conservation efforts.67 There are also environmental and
public health benefits from reduced electricity consumption be-
cause the pollution caused by its generation is decreased. 6 Re-
moving, reducing or eliminating the need for electricity where
possible is the environmentally responsible long-term solution for
New York because that electricity, and the pollution caused by its
generation will no longer be necessary.
PASNY took a considerable concerted effort to install the tur-
bines and have them operational by June 1, 2001. Public state-
ments illustrated the "immediate action" mode of the agency on
this project. PASNY created the impression that New York was
on the verge of an energy crisis like California's, where "rolling
blackouts" had significant impacts on the state. PASNY recently
stated in its public comments on a lawsuit brought by environ-
mental and public interest groups challenging PASNY's siting de-
cisions that "lelvery day's delay ... will push New York City one
day closer to California".69 The publicly available record shows
that the agency's allegations that New York was about to enter a
California-style energy crisis were without merit.
V. The California Comparison Was Unwarranted
In 2001, New York did not have problems similar to those
that struck California. This is because of electricity. system differ-
ences with California, such as electric generating capacity reserve
requirements, in-state generating capacity, and market struc-
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 184 (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of Eugene W. Zeltmann, President, PASNY), available at http:/!
www.nypa.gov/interest/10322a.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); see also N.Y. Power
Auth., Power Now! Generators, at http://www.nypa.gov/PowerNow/pn.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2003) (indicating $5,000,000 per unit was spent to "equip the plants with
the most advanced technology available for controlling pollution and reducing
noise.").
67. NYSERDA, SYSTEM BENEFITS CHARGE, supra note 65, at 21.
68. Id. at 3 (noting "programs from 2001 through 2006 electric savings of 13,000
GWh and emissions reductions of approximately 10,000 tons of NO., 20,000 tons of
SO 2 and nearly 6.0 million tons of CO2 ..").
69. Kirk Johnson, Critics of Power Generators Sue, Citing Threat to Environment,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at B4.
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ture. 70 As William Museler, head of the New York Independent
System Operator stated, "California's electricity market is de-
signed and operates in a materially different way from New York's
market . . . we need to be very careful not to draw generalized
conclusions and impose quick fixes."71
New York's installed reserve requirement is a NYISO 'margin
of error' established annually to ensure there is adequate electric-
ity in case of forced outages, deratings, and capacity/load relief.72
The installed reserve requirement is 18%, which translates to an
approximate 5,000 MW cushion, or supply surplus available under
peak demand. 73 California does not have such a requirement.
New York's peak demand was expected to be 30,200 MW in
2001, but the State had the capacity to generate over 35,636
MW.7 4 In addition to the generating capacity currently available
to the City, the installed reserve requirement will further be eased
by the 5,547 MW capacity currently moving through the Article X
process. 75 Several years must pass and a significant increase in
70. California electricity demand has increased by 2-3% a year for the past sev-
eral years but supply has not kept pace. Between 1996-1999 California's growing
economy caused peak period demand to increase by over 5,500 MW. California's rate
of increase is considerably higher than current increases in New York. New York's
demand for electricity has been rising about 1.5% a year, and the amount of electricity
demand for next year is still well beneath the state's electricity generation capability.
See MICHAEL KAHN & LORETTA LYNCH, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY OPTIONS AND CHAL-
LENGES: REPORT TO GOVERNOR GRAY DAVIS, available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/pub-
lished/report/GovReport.htm#TopofPage (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
71. NYISO Responds to PSC Market Examination, 2 CURRENTLY .. INSIGHT FOR
MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1 (2001) available at http://www.nyiso.comlservices/documents/
newsletters/pdf/currently_vol2noljan.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
72. See ANJALI SHEFFRIN, DEVELOPING AN EFFICIENT CA MARKET-CoMPARISON
OF OTHER US ISOs (2000), available at http://www.caiso.com/docs/O9003a6O8O/O5/a8/
09003a608005a8c8.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); see also NEW YORK INDEP. SYS. OP-
ERATOR, NYISO INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL, OVERVIEW OF INSTALLED CAPACITY
PLANNING AND PROCUREMENT PROCESS (2001), available at http://www.nyiso.com/mar-
kets/icap-auctions/icap-manual-nov-01/2_stage_2-icap-nov_2001.pdf (last visited
Feb. 4, 2003).
73. NYISO LOCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS STUDY, supra note 57, at 3. Imported elec-
tricity can count as part of the reserve margin. Currently that level is set at 3165
MW.
74. David Robinson, Electricity-Will There Be Enough?, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 21,
2001, at 1A.
75. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., ARTICLE X CASES, at http://www.
dps.state.ny.us/xtable.PDF (revised Dec. 31, 2002). Pending applications include As-
toria Energy, LLC, Astoria Queens totaling 1000 MW (estimated in-service date
2004); East River Repowering, Lower Manhattan totaling 360 MW (estimated in-ser-
vice date 2002); Poletti Station Expansion, Astoria Queens totaling 500 MW (esti-
mated in-service date 2004); Ravenswood Cogeneration Project, Long Island City,
Queens totaling 250 MW (estimated in-service date 2004); and Sunset Energy Fleet
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/16
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demand must occur before an electric generating capacity
shortage similar to California's could develop in New York. Over-
all, New York generates more than enough electricity in state.
The total amount of in-state generation will increase as more
power plants come online in the next few years.7 6 This does not
include the agreements that New York has established with the
surrounding electricity market. Even with the increased demand
in 2001, New York did not run out of electricity supply, contrary to
the assertions of the PSC, PASNY and NYISO. New York imports
only 10% of the electricity it consumes. New York has also made
several contingent arrangements with out-of-state suppliers,
should New York's electricity import needs increase above the cur-
rent 10% import level. 77
There are also market differences that separate New York
and California. Currently, California has a retail price cap that is
much lower. There is no equivalent in New York. 78 The Califor-
nia cap resulted in losses for utilities because they could not pass
the increases onto consumers, regardless of how high the whole-
sale market price went. To further exacerbate the impact of this
system, California prohibits utilities from reaching long-term elec-
tric supply contracts in favor of purchasing electricity on the spot
market where prices can shift dramatically. The unintended con-
sequences of the price cap and spot market fluctuation resulted in
California utilities approaching bankruptcy because they are
forced to absorb the increased wholesale prices paid to their elec-
tricity suppliers. "The caps prevented the state's utilities from
passing their costs onto ratepayers, creating no incentive for con-
LLC, Brooklyn totaling 520 MW. Preliminary scoping includes Oak Point Energy,
Brooklyn totaling 1075 MW and Orion Power Astoria Repowering Project, Astoria,
Queens totaling 1842 MW. Id.
76. See infra Part V (illustrating the 527 MW of new generating capacity cur-
rently in the Article X siting process).
77. See infra Part V. New York has agreements and power arrangements for ad-
ditional power supply with Hydro-Quebec, Pennsylvania-Maryland-New Jersey Inde-
pendent System Operator, and New England Independent System Operator. N.Y.S.
RELIABILITY COUNCIL, L.L.C., NEW YORK CONTROL AREA INSTALLED CAPACITY RE-
QUIREMENTS FOR THE PERIOD MAY 2001 THROUGH APRIL 2002: EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
RESOLUTION AND TECHNICAL STUDY REPORT (2000).
78. Power Disruptions, Price Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City
and Westchester: Hearing Before the Assembly Standing Com. on Energy, 223d Leg.
(N.Y. 2000) (testimony of Kevin McGrath, Representative, Consolidated Edison
Solutions).
2002] 443
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
sumers to conserve."79 As a result, California's major electricity
suppliers are reluctant to sell electricity to distributing utilities
for fear that they will not be paid. The financial problems at the
California utilities will ensure continued emergency situations.
VI. Energy Costs and the Flawed Market Structure of
Energy Deregulation
While public statements were made that installing the tur-
bines would avoid California-style blackouts in New York, PASNY
officials clearly indicated price considerations were playing just as
significant a role in the decision making process. In New York,
utility rates had doubled, and in some cases tripled. Consumers
were feeling these increases. As one owner of a small grocery
store indicated, "[a]nd last year's, this gentleman was charged
$11,432.98, and this year for the same period of time, he's charged
$22,398."80 The PASNY turbines were also intended to influence
those market prices. The candid admission amounts to PASNY
getting "back into" the power business after selling such assets as
the Indian Point 3 nuclear generating facility. PASNY admitted
that the turbines would be "bid into the New York ISO on a day-
ahead basis." 1' This is on top of the fact that turbines could be
run twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.8 2
79. Alex Berenson, Deregulation: A Movement Groping in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, § 4, at 6 (quoting Stephen Slifer, Chief American Economist, Lehman
Brothers).
80. Power Disruptions, Price Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City
and Westchester: Hearing before N.Y State Assembly Standing Comm. on Energy,
223d Leg. 207 (N.Y. 2000) (testimony of Nelson Eusebio).
81. Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to
Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 190 (N.Y.
2001) (testimony of New York Power Authority).
82. In a 2001 public hearing on energy issues PASNY President admitted that the
generators would be bid into the market each day, leaving the significant potential
that the generators will be running all the time. As President Zeltmann stated,
"[t]hey [(generators)] are going to be bid in the New York ISO on a day-ahead basis."
Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State to Site Gas
Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly Standing
Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities & Comm'ns, &
Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 191 (N.Y. 2001).
To which Assemblyman Richard Brodsky replied, "In other words, you are going
to bid it [power supply from the New York City Turbines] on an every day, every day,
no matter what the capacity, we could be well beneath that next capacity need, no
hint of brownout, no hint of blackout and these generators will run?" Id. (comments of
New York State Assemblyman Richard Brodsky).
444 [Vol. 20
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/16
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
There is little doubt that the ten turbines could provide an
electric supply cushion that the state hoped would offset the tre-
mendous price spikes in tight energy markets. When consumer
energy demand is high and energy supply tight, energy producers
can bid their supply into the market at a much higher price, know-
ing that their energy will be used because of such a demand. The
reasoning behind increased supply is to provide a cushion and
therefore this competition will lower energy prices. Running the
turbines 24-hours a day, 7-days a week regardless of need would
supply electricity that could lower prices for consumers. PASNY's
calculation, however, did not factor the environmental costs and
the community impacts and disruptions that the siting of these
turbines would cause. The residents of the communities where
the turbines were placed by PASNY, who are already dealing with
heavy industrial pollution and one of the highest asthma rates in
the world, would have to live deal with these costs during continu-
ous operation of the turbines.
Even by increasing the amount of generation within the state,
the current market structure is much to blame for the over-charg-
ing and market manipulation that will continue to increase con-
sumer rates. The system of energy bidding is fundamentally
flawed. The state energy system works on the premise of the
'market-clearing price.'8 3 Under this system all energy producers
place bids for electricity they are willing to supply in the day-
ahead, real-time or both markets. The ISO selects bids from the
generators up to a point where enough generation is available to
meet anticipated demand. When reconciled, suppliers are paid
the 'clearing price' based upon bid price paid. In other words,
when suppliers bid their energy into the system, all energy at the
lowest prices will be taken until the need is fulfilled. However,
fluctuation in supply can alter the balance of the market, allowing
those who charge higher prices for electricity to be purchased be-
cause that electricity is needed. Every supplier is paid the market
clearing price, which is the highest bid paid. So some suppliers
can bid their energy at next to nothing and actually get paid what
the highest bidder charged per MW, whether it is $250.00,
$500.00 or $1,000.00.
83. For a thorough review of the energy market rules and policy see NYISO's
Manuals, available at http://www.nyiso.com/services/documents/manuals/index.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
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Under this structure, market manipulation can and has oc-
curred.8 4 There have been several instances of market manipula-
tion and abuse.8 5 The ISO market structure keeps the abuses
private. As a quasi-public institution, the ISO that is entrusted
with the job of overseeing a fair energy process should but does
not disclose market manipulation to the consumers who are di-
rectly affected by such actions. The market clearing price mecha-
84. See Robert J. Michaels & Jerry Ellig, Energy-Price Spikes by Design?, 22
REGULATION 20 (1999) (commenting that the wholesale electricity market operated
with efficiency and price spikes are not evidence of the need for price controls); Wil-
liam A. Hogan, Electricity Market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms, (2001), availa-
ble at http://64.2.134.196/EnergyConf/hogan.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2003); Paul L.
Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP., 119, 119-38 (1997) (explaining that changes are being
made to encourage competition in the electric industry and to reform regulations and
distribution functions); Scott Harvey et al., Transmission Capacity Reservations Im-
plemented Through a Spot Market With Transmission Congestion Contracts, 9 ELEC.
J. 42 (1996) (noting that capacity reservations can be traded and would fully support
the competitive market).
85. See Issues Involving Decisions Made by the Power Authority of New York State
to Site Gas Turbine Generators in the City of New York: Hearing Before the Assembly
Standing Comm. on Energy, Assembly Standing Comm. on Corps., Authorities &
Comm'ns, & Assembly Standing Comm. on Envtl. Conservation, 224th Leg. 443-44
(N.Y. 2001):
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: It is my understanding you've identified
around a hundred market manipulations, suspected market
manipulations.
NYISO, William Museler: I'm not familiar with that number, sir. We
have identified instances of abuse of market power which in terms that-
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Who have you referred those abuses to?
CEO Museler: In the cases where we have authority to take action, we've
taken action. Our action is typically to do one of a number of things. One
is we could change bids; change a generator's bid (from) prospectively go-
ing forward. We do not have the authority to retroactively correct prices,
so that's-where we have the authority, we do that, we correct the prob-
lem going forward.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Could we have a list of those instances?
CEO Museler: We're not, based on the FERC order that we operate under
and the code of conduct that we operate under, we are not allowed to re-
late that information.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: May you refer to a law enforcement
agency?
CEO Museler: In certain instances we would have the ability to refer
things to the FTC.
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky: Other than the FTC, could you refer to
the Attorney General of the State of New York?
CEO Museler: I am not aware of anything in the regulations or the FERC
orders that we operate under that allow us to do that. .
Id. (emphasis added).
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nism and its susceptibility to market manipulation is part of the
new 'free market' for electricity that consumers are faced with,
and is one without substantial safety nets that ensure that elec-
tricity suppliers cannot use market forces to maximize their prof-
its at the expense of consumers.
VII. Conclusion: A Look Toward the Future
PASNY can and should play a role in achieving price stability
and system reliability in New York's electric market. The Califor-
nia crisis of the past few years has drawn much public attention to
the electricity system in the United States. California has also
illustrated what can go wrong when the state does not adequately
address or prepare for electric generating needs of its residents.
Addressing issues of price and supply, however, require a rational
and open process to develop the best strategy for state residents.
There are environmental and public health implications to how we
choose to deal with the future of our electricity markets. A knee-
jerk reaction to potential crises justified by questionable analyses
is not in anyone's long-term interests.
The PASNY turbine case was about more than making sure
electricity could be supplied to meet "peak load" requirements.
PASNY made it clear that price considerations also played a role.
In the haste to install and operate the turbines, two major envi-
ronmental review statutes in state law were effectively by-passed.
The courts heard arguments from community groups that chose to
challenge PASNY's environmental review process. They won.8 6 A
legally valid siting review process may have ultimately allowed
the ten power turbines to be built as proposed. The environmental
review would have provided a statutory mechanism for citizens to
raise concerns, and if significant, have them mitigated. Such stat-
utorily required review was undertaken after the turbines were
sited and constructed. The sites for the turbines are located in
predominately low-income, minority areas, with already high
levels of asthma and other health concerns from numerous envi-
ronmental facilities. Any price savings or mitigation resulting
from operation of these turbines must be judged in light of the
costs to these communities.
86. See UPROSE v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. Div. 2001); Silvercup Stu-
dios v. Power Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that there were defi-
ciencies in the Environmental Assessment, but the nameplate capacity issues were
not part of the decision).
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Deregulation of the electric market has been economically
and environmentally costly for many New Yorkers. As Assembly-
man Paul Tonko stated, "(i)t is ironic that three years after the
(Public Service) Commission and Company testified that deregu-
lation would drive down prices and would have no impact on relia-
bility, quite the opposite has happened."87 Electricity needs of
New York is not a problem that will go away by itself. The state
needs a long-term, environmentally sound energy policy, not mass
production of generator facilities without long-term vision or re-
gard for the law. There needs to be public and legislative input
into what this vision will be. New York is not California. Scare
tactics must not be used by government to push through an
agenda fraught with so many adverse effects. It is time to fix this
energy problem once and for all. The health and safety of New
York's residents as well as the preservation of the environment
depend on it.
In addition to the problems of deregulation, the NYPA tur-
bines and the LIPA turbines have significant costs: time and
money. Several hundred million dollars of state money have been
on the "temporary" and expensive operation of electric generating
turbines. Considerable effort and time is being put into their con-
struction and operation. The money and time would be much bet-
ter spent in reducing electricity demand and by developing
effective conservation programs. NYSERDA believes that current
proposals could have resulted in significant reductions in the
amount of electricity that must be generated to meet our electric-
ity needs. Conservation and reduced consumption strategies also
have considerable environmental and public health savings that
are not easily quantifiable in money terms. New York should
learn one valuable lesson from California: conservation can and
does work, and should be part of a carefully developed strategy for
our future electricity and energy needs.
87. Power Disruptions Price Increases, and Customer Issues in New York City and
Westchester: Hearing before N.Y State Assembly Standing Comm. on Energy, 223d
Leg. (N.Y. 2000) (comments of Assemblyman Paul Tonko).
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